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 and Christian Kurtz
**
 
These volumes of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consist of 
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s Ninth Annual 
Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 28, 2006, examine the 
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the 
calendar year 2005.1 The court handed down a total of 89 judgments in 
2005,2 29 (or 33 per cent) of which were constitutional cases. In a 
departure from previous years, only one-half of the constitutional 
decisions this year were Charter challenges,3 the other half being divided 
                                                                                                            
*
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1
 A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the 
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.  
2
 Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 1995-
2005, available online at <http://www.scc.csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat4_e.asp>.  
3
 Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 
[hereinafter “Montreal”]; Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 791 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]; Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board; Casimir v. 
Quebec (Attorney General); Zorrilla v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, [2005] 1 
S.C.R. 257 [hereinafter “Okwuobi”]; Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 15, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238 [hereinafter “Gosselin”]; Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 14, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 201 [hereinafter “Solski”]; UL Canada Inc. v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter “UL Canada”]; 
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] S.C.J. No. 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 [hereinafter 
“Toronto Star”]; R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 343 [hereinafter 
“Pires”]; R. v. Spence, [2005] S.C.J. No. 74, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 458 [hereinafter “Spence”]; R. v. 
Henry, [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 [hereinafter “Henry”]; Medovarski v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] S.C.J. No. 31, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539 [hereinafter 
“Medovarski”]; R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter 
“Orbanski”]; R. v. Chow, [2005] S.C.J. No. 22, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 384 [hereinafter “Chow”]; R. v. 
Wiles, [2005] S.C.J. No. 53, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895 [hereinafter “Wiles”]; R. v. C. (D.), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 77, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 133 [hereinafter “C. (D.)”]. 
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between federalism issues (eight cases),4 Aboriginal issues (two cases),5 
and five other constitutional cases.6  
I. CHARTER CASES 
In purely statistical terms, the Court did not appear to be particularly 
receptive to Charter claims in 2005, with only three out of 15 (or 20 per 
cent) of Charter claims succeeding. This is somewhat of a departure 
from recent experience under the McLachlin Court; in each of the three 
previous years, more than one-half of the Charter claims considered by 
the Court were successful.7 Nevertheless, while in percentage terms the 
Court may have appeared unreceptive to Charter claims in 2005, by far 
the most significant decision of the year was Chaoulli, where the Court 
boldly and unexpectedly struck down provisions in Quebec law 
prohibiting the sale of private health insurance. What was particularly 
remarkable about Chaoulli was the willingness of the Court to overturn 
a key provision of an important statute dealing with social policy, an 
area where the Court has traditionally been extremely deferential to the 
executive and legislative branches. Without a doubt, Chaoulli was the 
most significant constitutional case of the year, and potentially of the 
entire decade. 
                                                                                                            
4
 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 473 [hereinafter “Imperial Tobacco”]; Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 
22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Reference re EIA”]; Chaoulli v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]; 
Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] S.C.J. No. 68, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870 [hereinafter “Castillo”]; Kirkbi AG v. 
Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302 [hereinafter “Kirkbi”]; Fédération 
des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 
[hereinafter “Pelland”]; Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 188 [hereinafter “Rothmans”]; UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
[2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter “UL Canada”]. 
5
 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J. 
No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 [hereinafter “Mikisew”]; R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] S.C.J. 
No. 44, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [hereinafter “Marshall”]. 
6
 Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid, [2005] S.C.J. No. 28, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 667 
[hereinafter “Vaid”]; Provincial Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of 
Justice); Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence 
des juges du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General); Minc v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges”]. 
7
 See Patrick J. Monahan & Nadine Blum, “Constitutional Cases 2002: An Overview” 
(2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1; Jamie Cameron & Patrick J. Monahan, “Constitutional Cases 2003: An 
Overview” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1; Patrick J. Monahan & Evan Van Dyk, “Constitutional Cases 
2004: An Overview” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1.  
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1. Chaoulli and the Future of Health Care 
The Chaoulli decision has proven tremendously controversial among 
commentators, with the Court being criticized for having entrenched a 
“two-tier” system of health care in Canada.8 In fact, however, I believe 
that much of this criticism has resulted from a misreading of the Court’s 
judgment and is misplaced.9 In my view, the Court does not mandate a 
particular organization of the health care system but, instead, merely 
indicates that there are legal limits to the length of time that patients can 
be expected to wait for care in the context of a universal health care 
system. All the Court has required, in other words, is that if the 
government wishes to maintain a universal public health care system 
and continue to preclude a parallel private system it can do so, provided 
that it ensures timely access to medically necessary care.  
At issue in Chaoulli were provisions in Quebec legislation which 
prohibited anyone from contracting for private insurance for a service 
that was available through the public system, and which prohibited 
payment for services that were insured hospital services.10 Dr. Jacques 
Chaoulli, a doctor who wanted to offer private health services, and 
George Zeliotis, a Quebec patient who had been on a waiting list for hip 
replacement surgery, challenged these provisions on the basis that they 
violated their rights to life, liberty and security of the person guaranteed 
by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Right and Freedoms.11  
Although the majority of the Supreme Court upheld these claims, 
the Court did so on the basis of an argument that was somewhat more 
limited than that advanced by the appellants Chaoulli and Zeliotis. In 
particular, the Court did not accept the argument to the effect that the 
Charter guarantees an individual the right to choose between a public 
and a private provider of health care. Nor did the Court rule that there 
was a constitutional right to the establishment of a parallel privately 
funded health care system. Rather, the focus of the two majority 
                                                                                                            
8
 See, for example, Sujit Choudhry, “Worse than Lochner?”, in Colleen Flood, Kent 
Roach & Lorne Sossin, Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate over Health Care in 
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2005), at 75; Allan Hutchinson, “Condition Critical: The 
Constitution & Health Care”, in Flood, Roach and Sossin, id., at 101. 
9
 I acknowledge that I acted as co-counsel in Chaoulli to the group of senators, led by 
Senators Michael Kirby and Marjory LeBreton, who intervened in the case.  
10
 See s. 15 of the Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29 and s. 11 of the Hospital 
Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28. 
11
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
6 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
judgments in the Supreme Court was on the lack of timely care in the 
public health care system. 
The fundamental issue that was raised by the Court was whether it 
is constitutionally justifiable for governments to legislatively preclude a 
patient from seeking access to necessary medical treatment, when such 
treatment is not available in a timely manner in the public system. 
According to the judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Major J., the key 
difficulty is that the government and legislature established a monopoly 
on the provision of health care services and then failed to deliver care in 
a timely fashion: 
By imposing exclusivity and then failing to provide public health care 
of a reasonable standard within a reasonable time, the government 
creates circumstances that trigger the application of s. 7 of the Charter 
… The state has effectively limited access to private health care except 
for the very rich, who can afford private care without need of 
insurance. This virtual monopoly, on the evidence, results in delays in 
treatment that adversely affect the citizen’s security of the person. 
Where a law adversely affects life, liberty or security of the person, it 
must conform to the principles of fundamental justice. This law, in our 
view, fails to do so.12 
Later in the judgment, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. note that the 
question in the case is not whether single-tier health care is preferable to 
two-tier care. They further note that the prohibition on obtaining private 
health insurance might well be justifiable in circumstances where health 
care services are reasonable as to both quality and timeliness. But these 
prohibitions cannot be sustained where care is not being delivered in a 
reasonable and timely manner: “if the government chooses to act, it 
must do so properly.”13 
Similarly, Deschamps J. frames the question before the Court as 
being “whether Quebeckers who are prepared to spend money to get 
access to health care that is, in practice, not accessible in the public 
sector because of waiting lists may be validly prevented from doing so 
by the state”. 14 Justice Deschamps acknowledges that the government 
                                                                                                            
12
 Chaoulli, supra, note 3, at paras. 105-106. 
13
 Id., at paras. 108 and 158. 
14
 Id., at para. 4. It should be noted that Deschamps J. based her analysis on s. 9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 and therefore did not find it 
necessary to rule on the question of whether the prohibitions in Quebec law were inconsistent with 
the Canadian Charter. Nevertheless, the reasoning and analysis in her judgment are equally 
applicable to the Canadian Charter and, indeed, mirror precisely the analysis and conclusions of 
McLachlin C.J. and Major J. 
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has the right to discourage the emergence of a parallel private health 
care system, but that the issue raised is excessive waiting times: 
… when my colleagues ask whether Quebec has the power under the 
Constitution to discourage the establishment of a parallel private 
health care system, I can only agree with them that it does. But that is 
not the issue in the appeal. The appellants do not contend that they 
have a constitutional right to private insurance. Rather, they contend 
that the waiting times violate their rights to life and security. It is the 
measure chosen by the government that is in issue, not Quebeckers’ 
need for a public health care system.15 
A variety of arguments were raised in support of the prohibitions on 
access to private care. One such argument was that the prohibitions were 
necessary in order to prevent the emergence of a parallel private system, 
since such a parallel system would then drain off human resources from 
the public plan as many physicians and other health care professionals 
left the public plan. This could lead to increased waiting times in the 
public plan and diminish the quality of care available to those who were 
not in a position to afford private insurance. 
There were a number of clear answers to this argument. The first, 
and perhaps most obvious, was that the government was perfectly 
entitled to maintain the existing prohibitions and to suppress the 
emergence of a parallel private health care system, provided that it 
ensured that medically necessary care was available in the public system 
in a reasonably timely manner. What the government cannot do is 
attempt to have it both ways: it cannot legally require Canadians to 
access health care through a single-payer public system, and then fail to 
provide the care needed when Canadians are sick. As noted above, this 
was precisely the argument advanced by McLachlin C.J. and Major J., 
as well as by Deschamps J. 
Further, where the government seeks to justify a measure as a 
“reasonable limitation” under section 1 of the Charter, it is common for 
the courts to consider whether a similar limit has been enacted in other 
countries with analogous political and legal systems. In the event that 
other analogous jurisdictions have not enacted the prohibition(s) in 
issue, this is usually regarded as evidence that the measure cannot be 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” since there are 
other alternatives available to achieve the desired objective(s). In 
                                                                                                            
15
 Id., at para. 14. 
8 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Chaoulli both the majority judgments pointed out that very few 
jurisdictions have attempted to totally ban individuals from using their 
own resources to access medically necessary care, and yet these 
jurisdictions had properly functioning universal health care systems. 
Thus it can hardly be maintained that the prohibitions in question 
represent a minimal impairment of the rights of individuals who are 
forced to wait for medically necessary care in circumstances that can 
cause severe physical and psychological harm and even death.  
When members of the Supreme Court of Canada disagree with each 
other, they normally do so in measured and polite tones. Not so in 
Chaoulli, where Binnie and LeBel JJ. issued a blistering dissent in the 
combative style more commonly associated with the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The dissenters charge that the majority judgments had proceeded 
on the basis of wholly political rather than legal argument. First, even 
conceding that waiting may constitute a problem for “some Quebeckers 
in some circumstances”,16 there was no systematic evidence about the 
extent of wait times and, in any event, it was beyond the expertise of 
judges to determine what was a reasonable wait for care. “How many 
MRIs does the Constitution require?”, they ask rhetorically.17  
Second, they point out that there was extensive evidence at trial 
supporting the conclusion that a “U.S. two-tier system of health 
coverage” would have a negative impact on wait times in the public 
system. For example, there was evidence from other jurisdictions 
suggesting that parallel private insurers would “skim the cream” by 
siphoning off high-income patients while shying away from patients 
who constitute a higher financial risk, with the result that the public 
system would carry a disproportionate burden of patients considered 
high risk. Even if this evidence was contested or controversial, it had 
been accepted by the trial judge, who had concluded that the creation of 
a parallel private system would harm the public system. In Binnie and 
LeBel JJ.’s view, the Supreme Court of Canada ought to defer to 
governments and legislatures, as well as to the trial judge, on these 
complex policy matters.  
Significantly, Binnie and LeBel JJ. did not provide a response to the 
principled argument in the majority judgments that if a government 
wishes to establish a monopoly over the provision of certain medically 
                                                                                                            
16
 Id., at para. 207 (emphasis in original). 
17
 Id., at para. 163. 
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necessary services, it thereby comes under an obligation to provide care 
in a timely manner. It is certainly true, as the dissenting justices suggest 
with their rhetorical question regarding MRIs, that the determination of 
reasonable waiting times requires a difficult exercise of judgment. But 
the fact that such a determination is difficult does not mean that 
governments and health care administrators should thereby be relieved 
of any obligation to provide care in a timely manner. By way of 
analogy, the fact that it may be difficult to determine what constitutes an 
acceptable speed on a highway does not mean that governments would 
thereby be justified in abolishing speed limits. Of course, just as speed 
limits on the highways are fixed by traffic experts rather than the courts, 
the determination of acceptable wait times must be made by qualified 
medical professionals rather than judges; what the courts can mandate is 
simply that there must be enforceable limits on waiting time determined 
by qualified medical professionals, if the state wishes to establish a 
universal, single-payer delivery model and prohibit individuals from 
accessing private care. 
What is the significance of the fact that Chaoulli was a 4-3 decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, with one of the members of the 
majority (Deschamps J.) relying on the Quebec Charter of human rights 
and freedoms18 to strike down the Quebec legislation, and declining to 
rule on the issue of whether the impugned legislation also violated the 
Canadian Charter? In this sense, the six members of the Supreme Court 
who dealt with the Canadian Charter split 3-3 on the issue of whether 
the Quebec legislation violated the Canadian Charter. Could it therefore 
be argued that the principle of patient accountability which I have 
outlined in this paper applies only in the province of Quebec, and that it 
remains an open question as to whether the Supreme Court’s principled 
approach applies in the other provinces and territories?  
In fact, I do not believe that this outcome is either legally or 
politically sustainable. First, while it is true that Deschamps J. relied 
upon the Quebec Charter rather than the Canadian Charter to rule the 
impugned provisions to be invalid, the arguments she utilized were 
identical to those adopted by McLachlin C.J. and Major J. in their 
Charter analysis, and were diametrically opposed to the position of 
dissenting Justices Binnie and LeBel. Thus, while her judgment was 
technically limited to the Quebec Charter, it is legally implausible to 
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 R.S.Q. c. C-12. 
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read her reasoning as supporting a different conclusion under the 
Canadian Charter.  
More fundamentally, post-Chaoulli it is simply not sustainable 
politically for political leaders outside of Quebec to suggest that their 
citizens lack basic rights to timely care that are available in Quebec. In 
fact, the political discussions that have occurred over the past year have 
implicitly accepted that the result in Chaoulli applies across the country, 
rather than in a single province.19 There is strong popular support for 
Chaoulli in all provinces and across all income and age groups20 and, 
with the aging of the population, political pressure and demand for 
timely medical care will only increase rather than diminish. 
2. Other Successful Charter Cases 
There were two other successful Charter cases in 2005, Solski21 and 
Toronto Star.22 In Solski, the court used section 23 of the Charter to 
“read down” the requirement in section 73 of the Quebec Charter of the 
French language,23 which limited access to English-language education 
in Quebec to those children who had received the “major part” of their 
education in English; the Court held that children who had received a 
“substantial part” of (rather than a “majority of”) their education in the 
minority language should be deemed to satisfy the “major part” 
requirement in section 73 of the Charter of the French language. This 
narrowing of section 73 would not appear to have a material impact on 
access to English-language education in Quebec. The Toronto Star case 
affirmed that once executed, search warrants are presumptively public 
documents absent serious risk to the administration of justice, and that 
the Dagenais/Mentuck test24 remains the appropriate means of applying 
this criterion. This carried forward the principle recognized in other 
                                                                                                            
19
 Thus in the discussions in the health policy community in recent months, health care 
administrators have accepted that they are bound to respond to Chaoulli and have discussed the 
ways in which this is occurring in all provinces and territories. See, for example, Brian Postl, Final 
Report of the Federal Advisor on Wait Times (June 2006) available at: <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca>. 
20
 See, for example, Ipsos-Reid, “Canadian Views on Health Care Scenarios” (June 7, 
2006), available at: <http://www.ipsos-na.com>. 
21
 Supra, note 3. 
22
 Supra, note 3. 
23
 R.S.Q., c. C-11. 
24
 Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [2005] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; 
R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442. 
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cases to the effect that court proceedings and documents are 
presumptively open to public scrutiny. 
3. Unsuccessful Charter Cases  
There were a total of 11 decisions where Charter claims failed in 2005. 
Seven of these were criminal cases involving: RIDE programs;25 the 
admissibility of wiretap evidence;26 the right to challenge jurors for 
racial bias;27 the right to cross-examine affiants in wiretap 
authorizations;28 the cross-examination of accused on prior inconsistent 
statements;29 and a mandatory firearm prohibition order in the Criminal 
Code.30 Charter claims also failed in two freedom of expression cases,31 
an immigration case involving a section 7 claim,32 and a section 23 case 
from Quebec.33 The latter case, Gosselin, was significant in that it 
                                                                                                            
25
 C. (D.), supra, note 3: First Nations constables may set up RIDE programs outside 
reserves; therefore, the accused was not arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9. Orbanski, supra, note 
3: Police may question motorists about their drinking and administer roadside screening device 
tests without providing the opportunity to retain counsel — this limit on s. 10(b) is justified under s. 
1.  
26
 Chow, supra, note 3: Wiretap evidence is admissible (in accordance with s. 8) despite 
the fact that the accused was not “named” in wiretap authorizations. Further, the accused is not 
entitled to a separate trial to compel co-accused to testify.  
27
 Spence, supra, note 3: Counsel for the accused does not have a right to challenge jurors 
on the basis of sympathy for the race of the victim of the alleged crime.  
28
 Pires, supra, note 3: Affirms the right to cross-examine the affiant in proceedings to 
obtain wiretap authorization subject to Garofoli test (reasonable likelihood that cross-examination 
will elicit evidence of probative value) [R. v. Garofoli, [1990] S.C.J. No. 115, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 
1421]. 
29
 Henry, supra, note 3: Section 13 does not preclude cross-examination of the accused on 
prior inconsistent statements based on voluntary testimony from an earlier trial on the same 
indictment; s. 13 only applies to compelled testimony.   
30
 Wiles, supra, note 3: The mandatory 10-year firearms prohibition required by s. 109(1) 
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 does not constitute “cruel and unusual” punishment and 
therefore does not violate s. 12.  
31
 UL Canada, supra, note 3: Provincial legislation regulating the colour of margarine does 
not limit freedom of expression; Montreal (City), supra, note 3: Noise by-law limits freedom of 
expression but is justified under s. 1. 
32
 Medovarski, supra, note 3: In cases where an individual is convicted of a serious crime, 
the removal of the right of appeal against a deportation order does not violate s. 7; deportation of a 
non-citizen does not in itself violate s. 7.  
33
 Gosselin, supra, note 3: Claim that s. 73 of the Quebec Charter of the French language, 
which provides access to English-language schools under certain circumstances, is discriminatory; 
parents who were part of the French-speaking majority wanted their children to attend English-
language schools. The Court held that this was beyond the purpose of s. 23 of the Charter; if 
accepted, this argument would effectively eliminate the compromise contained in s. 23.  
12 Supreme Court Law Review (2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
clarified that minority-language education rights in Quebec do not 
extend to French-speaking parents in Quebec. 
II. FEDERALISM CASES 
The court handed down decisions on eight federalism cases in 2005 and 
in all of these cases the constitutional challenge or claim was 
unsuccessful. Imperial Tobacco34 and Rothmans35 saw challenges to the 
provincial regulation of the tobacco industry turned back, while 
Reference re EIA36 saw federal maternity and parental leave benefits 
upheld. 
The Imperial Tobacco case was particularly significant. First, it 
clarified the Court’s approach to the interpretation of the “in the 
province” requirement in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1982. At 
issue in the case was the validity of a provincial statute which made 
extra-provincial manufacturers of tobacco products liable for health care 
costs incurred in British Columbia in respect of tobacco-related 
diseases. It was argued that the law was directed at matters outside the 
province of British Columbia, since the head offices and decision-
making of the tobacco manufacturers were located outside B.C. The 
Court rejected this challenge, however, noting that there were strong 
relationships among the enacting territory (British Columbia), the 
subject matter of the law (compensation for the government of British 
Columbia’s tobacco-related health care costs) and the persons made 
subject to it (the tobacco manufacturers ultimately responsible for those 
costs). Further, the Act respected the legislative sovereignty of other 
jurisdictions. This was because the cause of action related to 
                                                                                                            
34
 Supra, note 4: The Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 
2000, c. 30 authorizes the government of British Columbia to bring an action against tobacco 
manufacturers to recover health care costs. This Act was held to be a constitutionally valid exercise 
of provincial power because it is meaningfully connected to the province and there are strong 
relationships among the enacting territory, the subject matter and the persons to whom it applies.  
35
 Rothmans, supra, note 4: Provincial legislation banning the display of tobacco products 
is not inconsistent with a federal provision allowing the display; the federal provision merely 
circumscribes a more general prohibition in federal law and is not frustrated by the application of 
provincial law.  
36
 Supra, note 4: Challenge to ss. 22 and 23 of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, 
c. 23 as valid exercise of federal power — the Act was held to be constitutional.  The pith and 
substance of both parental and maternity benefits is to provide replacement income during an 
interruption of employment; replacement income falls under Parliament’s jurisdiction granted in s. 
91(2A) of the  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. 
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expenditures by the government of British Columbia for the health care 
of British Columbians. No other jurisdiction could possibly assert a 
stronger connection to that cause of action than British Columbia. Thus 
the Act could apply to tobacco manufacturers even though their 
corporate decision-makers and manufacturing facilities might be located 
outside the province. 
An additional challenge to the legislation in Imperial Tobacco was 
based on the fact that it applied retroactively, and it conferred certain 
advantages or established certain presumptions in favour of the Crown 
in proceedings brought under the Act. It was argued that these features 
of the legislation were inconsistent with the principle of the rule of law, 
which was said to require that legislation be prospective and general, 
and that legislation not confer special advantages on the government. 
The Supreme Court noted that there was no constitutional requirement 
of prospectivity or generality in legislation, nor was it improper for 
legislation to confer special advantages on the government. The Court 
also commented more generally on the appropriateness of seeking to 
challenge legislation on the basis of the principle of the rule of law: 
 The rule of law is not an invitation to trivialize or supplant the 
Constitution’s written terms. Nor is it a tool by which to avoid 
legislative initiatives of which one is not in favour. On the contrary, it 
requires that courts give effect to the Constitution’s text, and apply, by 
whatever its terms, legislation that conforms to that text.37 
One might have thought that these comments would close the door 
to future litigation on the basis of the constitutional principle of the “rule 
of law”.38 It should be noted, however, that the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal has subsequently ruled that it is possible to utilize the 
principle of the rule of law to challenge legislation which limits the 
access of citizens to the courts.39 Thus it would be premature to conclude 
that Imperial Tobacco has completely closed the door to challenges to the 
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validity of legislation based on the principle of rule of law, although 
certainly the case narrows the width of any opening that might remain.  
III. ABORIGINAL CASES 
Two Aboriginal cases reached the Supreme Court in 2005, Mikisew40 
and Marshall.41 In Mikisew, the Crown failed to discharge its “obligation 
to consult” under section 35 when it unilaterally declared that a winter 
road would be shifted from reserve land to a track along its boundary. 
However, the court emphasized that the Crown’s duty in this case was 
relatively low and could be discharged by limited consultation in the 
future.  
Marshall is an important decision because it affirms that Aboriginal 
title requires proof of exclusive occupation. The trial judges in this 
litigation42 had required proof of regular and exclusive use of the 
relevant lands to establish Aboriginal title. The Courts of Appeal held 
that this test was too strict and applied a less onerous standard of 
incidental or proximate occupancy. The Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed that the approaches taken by the trial judges were correct, 
distinguishing claims of Aboriginal rights from those of title. Aboriginal 
title requires proof of Aboriginal practices that indicate possession 
similar to that associated with title at common law. The Court 
emphasized that such a determination must be made taking into account 
the Aboriginal perspective, and noted that exploiting the land, rivers or 
seaside for hunting, fishing or other resources may translate into 
Aboriginal title to the land if the activity was sufficiently regular and 
exclusive to comport with title at common law. However, the Court also 
found that more typically, seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised 
in a particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing right rather than 
title. In this case, the trial judges had concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence of exclusive possession of the particular areas over 
which title was being claimed, and there was no claim advanced on the 
basis of an Aboriginal right to engage in particular activities. Therefore 
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the Supreme Court reversed the Courts of Appeal and restored the trial 
judgments.  
IV. OTHER CASES 
There were a total of four cases dealing with judicial compensation in 
2005, three of which were unsuccessful.43 The Court clarified the fact 
that recommendations of salary review commissions are advisory rather 
than binding, and that the government could depart from these advisory 
committee recommendations if this is justified with “rational” reasons; 
this low threshold should be easy to meet and should therefore 
discourage litigation over judicial salaries in the future. In fact, although 
the claim advanced by the Quebec judges succeeded, the Court in effect 
provided a “road map” for provinces wishing to depart from future 
commission recommendations.44 
V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
cases in 2005 was the high degree of unanimity among members of the 
Court. The Court was unanimous in 25 of the 29 constitutional cases (86 
per cent), which is the highest rate of unanimity in the last decade.45 Five 
members of the court (McLachlin C.J., Major, Deschamps, Abella and 
Charron JJ.) did not dissent in a single constitutional case in 2005. In 
fact, the only closely divided decision in 2005 was Chaoulli, where the 
Court split 3-3 on the application of the Canadian Charter, with 
Deschamps J.’s ruling that the legislation at issue violated the Quebec 
Charter proving decisive. In the other 14 Charter cases, there were only 
two cases that featured dissents, Orbanski, where LeBel and Fish JJ. 
dissented in a 7-2 decision holding that police may question motorists 
about their drinking and administer roadside screening without 
providing access to counsel; and Montréal, where Binnie J. dissented in 
a 6-1 decision upholding the application of a municipal noise by-law. 
The only other dissent in the 2005 constitutional decisions came in 
Castillo, where the Court, by an 8-1 margin, upheld the application of a 
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provision in Alberta’s Limitations Act46 over the dissent of Bastarache J. 
on federalism grounds. Of particular significance was the unanimity in 
the two Aboriginal cases, particularly the important Marshall case 
clarifying the application of the doctrine of Aboriginal title.  
It is evident that the current Court has managed to achieve a 
relatively unusual degree of consensus. Moreover, the membership of 
the Court is likely to remain stable for the foreseeable future; although 
Rothstein J. joined the Court in early 2006, there are no additional 
retirements mandated until November 2013, when Fish J. reaches the 
mandatory retirement age of 75. Barring an unforeseen change in the 
interim, the current degree of consensus among the members of the 
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